Review of “Kissinger: Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy” by Martin Indyk

Henry Kissinger , born May 27, 1923 in Bavaria, came to the US with his family in 1938 when fleeing Nazi Germany. He served as National Security Advisor (1969-1975) and United States Secretary of State (1973-1977). Both of these positions were held during the administrations first of Richard Nixon and then of Gerald Ford.

Kissinger is known for many diplomatic achievements, including – on the positive side – pioneering the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, orchestrating the opening of relations with China, engaging in what became known as shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East to end the Yom Kippur War, and negotiating the Paris Peace Accords, ending American involvement in the Vietnam War. He was also the architect of some more controversial policies, especially when it came to favoring “Realpolitik” over “quibbles” regarding human rights.

In any event, this particular book is a long and in-depth examination of Kissinger’s diplomacy in the Middle East. The author was not only able to interview Kissinger, but has considerable experience of his own enabling him to assess Kissinger’s role intelligently. Indyk served twice as United States ambassador to Israel, from 1995 to 1997, and again from 2000 to 2001. In the interim, he was as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs. He was executive vice president at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C from 2001-2018. Indyk took leave from the Brookings Institution to serve as the U.S. Special Envoy for Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations from 2013 to 2014. He is currently a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Indyk provides background to readers to lay the ground for what Kissinger had to deal with in the Middle East. The Six Day War in 1967 left Israel in possession of three substantial tracts of land formerly governed by Arab countries: (1) the Sinai Peninsula—Egypt; (2) the Golan Heights—Syria; and (3) the West Bank of the Jordan River and East Jerusalem—Jordan. The most serious fighting ended with the unequivocal defeat of all Arab armies, but neither Egypt nor Syria was willing to give up its claim for the occupied areas. Neither invaded the territory seized by Israel, but both conducted minor incursions and engaged in occasional exchanges of artillery fire with the Israelis. Jordan still claimed the lost territory, but seemed unwilling or unable to generate any enthusiasm for continued armed hostilities.

In 1970, the politics of the Middle East underwent a significant change with the death of Gamal Nasser, the President of Egypt. Nasser had made Egypt a client state of the Soviet Union. His successor, Anwar Sadat, had no use for the Soviets, however, and pursued a radically different path in his foreign relations.

Sadat originally was perceived to be weak and not likely to last more than a few months. Israel was in possession of the entire Sinai up to the east bank of the Suez Canal. Sadat apparently felt the Soviets were incapable of assisting the Egyptians to regain possession of the Sinai even though they had supplied him with surface-to-air missiles that could effectively defend the Suez Canal. His first move was to fire and arrest a cadre of generals who were clients of the USSR. He then expelled 12,000 Soviet advisors because he thought they might try to block his plan for regaining the Sinai by starting a war with Israel.

President Anwar Sadat of Egypt upon his arrival in the US in 1980 for a visit. Photograph taken at Andrews Air Force Base, via Wikipedia.

Egypt and Syria were able to completely surprise the Israelis on Yom Kippur 1973 with a coordinated invasion of both the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Israel repelled the invasions only with the substantial supply of high tech weapons from the United States. Prior to that time Kissinger had had little or no experience in the Middle East, but he attempted to impose 19th century balance of power analysis on the situation. Kissinger was instrumental in getting the emergency supplies to Israel, but he slowed the resupply of arms when it appeared that the Israelis might be able to upset the balance of power with another overwhelming victory.

According to Indyk, Kissinger was more interested in order than in peace. He fervently wanted Israel’s survival, a feeling Indyk attributes to his Jewish heritage. But he also wanted to establish a stable balance of power and for the United States to replace the Soviet Union as the principal major power in the region. To achieve both goals, he believed he had to induce the Israelis to be willing to trade some of the territory they conquered in 1967 for enforceable undertakings of non-belligerence and recognition from the Arab states.

Kissinger strove mightily to negotiate a cease fire agreement. Egypt had to get some sense of accomplishment, but not too much. Kissinger and Brezhnev, the Russian Premier, negotiated the cease fire agreements without consulting either Israel or the Arabs [in a continuation of the imperialistic determination of the fate of the region by outside actors]. The cease fire agreements referred to UN Resolution 242, which anticipated that Israel would withdraw to some indefinite borders, but not specifically the 1967 borders.

Henry Kissinger and Leonid Brezhnev

The cease fire agreements were negotiated in a matter of weeks, but the ultimate “land for peace” agreements took two years of painstaking “shuttle diplomacy” between countries that hated and distrusted each other. Only by establishing a high level of trust in himself was Kissinger able to induce the warring parties to make compromises necessary for agreement.

In the striving for peace, Kissinger and Indyk give high marks to Egypt’s Sadat, who comes across as a true statesman. Surprisingly, Hafez al Assad is described a wily, highly intelligent, and possessed of a keen sense of humor. None of the Israeli politicians are described as anything but highly suspicious, stubborn, and short-sighted. Golda Meir, the Israeli Prime Minister, was particularly reluctant to cede any territory, but Kissinger forcefully let her know that she simply had to do what the U.S. required. Later American presidents and secretaries of state have had much less success in imposing their will on Bibi Netanyahu.

Kissinger sought more than just peace. He wanted to establish a viable balance of power, which he argued required both legitimacy and equivalence. Thus, the Arabs had to recognize Israel and Israel had to have roughly equivalent, but not superior, power. In the event, Kissinger’s settlement lasted more than 30 years. Moreover, he was successful in helping the U.S. to supplant the U.S.S.R. as the principal power in the region.

Since Kissinger’s departure from the scene, American influence has waned materially. Indyk points out that in 2013 American power was so limited that when President Obama told Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian National Authority (PLO) that he would propose that the Palestinians be granted East Jerusalem as their capital, Abbas replied “give me a few days to check with my people” and then never even replied. Indyk rates Trump’s efforts at exerting influence as even less successful. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu simply ignored the presence of the Palestinians and pushed ahead with new settlements in the occupied West Bank in defiance of U.N. resolutions.

The author places Kissinger in a class with Metternich and other “masters of the game.” A review of this book in “The New York Times” wryly notes: “He is not the first to do this. Kissinger has made the case for himself in an outpouring of thick, ponderous books, most especially his more than 3,000 pages of memoirs, published in three volumes. Among modern statesmen, only Winston Churchill wrote more to promote himself.”

Evaluation: Indyk’s book provides a valuable insight into the history and politics of the Middle East.

Rating: 4/5

Published by Knopf Publishing Group, 2021