June 21, 1915 – Women’s Suffrage Speech by Anna Howard Shaw: “The Fundamental Principle of a Republic”

Anna Howard Shaw (1847 – 1919) was a leader of the women’s suffrage movement in the United States. She was born in the U.K., but her family emigrated to the U.S. and settled in Massachusetts when she was four. She was intelligent and ambitious, but continually had career paths closed off to her because of her gender. She persevered, however, and eventually became not only a physician but also one of the first ordained female Methodist ministers in the United States. Because of her experiences, she became an outspoken advocate of political rights for women.

Anna Howard Shaw

Anna Howard Shaw

Shaw first met Susan B. Anthony in 1887. Anthony encouraged her to join the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), and beginning in 1904 and for the next eleven years, Shaw served as the president of NAWSA.

During the early 20th century, Alice Paul and Lucy Burns, NAWSA members, began employing “militant” techniques (e.g. picketing the White House during World War I) to fight for women’s suffrage. But Shaw maintained that she was “unalterably opposed to militancy, believing nothing of permanent value has ever been secured by it that could not have been more easily obtained by peaceful methods,” and in 1915, she resigned as NAWSA president and was replaced by her ally Carrie Chapman Catt.

Anna Howard Shaw with Carrie Chapman Catt in 1917

Anna Howard Shaw with Carrie Chapman Catt in 1917

She continued to speak out for women’s rights, however, and the speech she delivered on this date at the City Opera House in Ogdenburg, New York iduring the New York State equal suffrage campaign is considered to be one of the top 100 speeches of the Twentieth Century.

Some of the highlights of her speech:

If woman’s suffrage is wrong, it is a great wrong; if it is right, it is a profound and fundamental principle, and we all know, if we know what a Republic is, that it is the fundamental principle upon which a Republic must rise. Let us see where we are as a people; how we act here and what we think we are.”

And God said in the beginning, “It is not good for man to stand alone.” That is why we are here tonight, and that is all that woman’s suffrage means; just to repeat again and again that first declaration of the Divine, “It is not good for man to stand alone,” and so the women of this state are asking that the word “male” shall be stricken out of the Constitution altogether and that the Constitution stand as it ought to have stood in the beginning and as it must before this state is any part of a Republic. Every citizen possessing the necessary qualifications shall be entitled to cast one vote at every election, and have that vote counted. We are not asking as our Anti-Suffrage friends think we are, for any of awful things that we hear will happen if we are allowed to vote; we are simply asking that that government which professes to be a Republic shall be a Republic and not pretend to be what it is not.”

We have our theories, our beliefs, but as suffragists we have but one belief, but one principle, but one theory and that is the right of a human being to have a voice in the government, under which he or she lives, on that we agree, if on nothing else.”

You can read the entire speech here.

Review of “Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-1945” by Max Hastings

This is an exceptionally well-written book about the final year of the war against Japan. Hastings smoothly intermixes grand strategic analysis with poignant anecdotes from “little people” whose stories are part of the vast tale of WWII.


Hastings argues that our understanding of the events of 1939-45 would be improved by referring to World Wars II, since the only thing in common between the Europe conflict and the Pacific war was the identity of adversaries.

He points out that a Japanese attack on the Soviet rear in 1941 would have had much more consequence than Pearl Harbor, where they did not smash the American fleet, but sank only six old battleships, two of which were repaired and fought later in the war. Hitler did not even try to enlist Japanese assistance until the loss of Stalingrad in 1943, by which time the Japanese could offer very little.

It also helps our understanding of the war to realize that the Japanese did not attack independent countries in Asia. Rather, they invaded colonial outposts that Europeans had dominated for generations. Japanese treatment of the Asian people they conquered was even worse than their treatment of whites they captured.


Hastings blames the Japanese warrior ethic of bushido for the barbarous way their armed forces treated conquered people and prisoners. Their cult of honor precluded individual surrender, even requiring suicide to avoid loss of face. That attitude caused them to treat prisoners with contempt and made it exceedingly difficult for them to admit defeat. At a time when 50,000 Germans were surrendering each month, the Allies held fewer than 2,000 Japanese prisoners. Many Japanese who appeared ready to surrender were actually setting traps to kill their putative captors. Japanese sailors rescued from drowning by Americans after their own ships were sunk often tried to sabotage the rescuing vessels. After many such incidents early in the war, Americans became justifiably reluctant to take prisoners.

Hastings tells the tale of the British fighting in Burma under their very able general William Slim. Fighting was brutal and logistics were dreadful. Although the effort was heroic and competent, that theater did little or nothing to end the war.

Hastings paints incisive portraits of some of the principal characters of the drama. Stalin is calculating and ruthless, no surprise here. Truman is limited in talent, but his wisdom, honesty, and general goodness enables him to make great decisions. MacArthur is egomaniacal and not even a good general, but his behavior after the surrender was magnanimous and admirable. Nimitz and the navy did much more than MacArthur’s army to defeat the Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek was petty, ineffectual, and corrupt, much more interested in fighting Mao that the Japanese. Mao stayed out of the way of the Japanese and avoided conflict until the Japanese had been defeated and left China.

B-29s in formation near Mt. Fuji

B-29s in formation near Mt. Fuji

The story of the B-29 is particularly interesting. The development of the bomber was more expensive than the development of the atomic bomb. Moreover, the first B-29s delivered were not very reliable, and were as much a danger to their own crew as to the Japanese. The first B-29s were deployed in India and China, but the Japanese soon conquered enough Chinese territory to drive the B-29s out of range of the home islands. The later models of the plane became very formidable, and rugged enough to hold off Japanese fighter aircraft by themselves.

By August 1945, the Soviets were no longer allies of the Americans. The U.S. would have preferred for the Russians to stay out of the war, but Stalin ordered 1.5 million soldiers to invade Manchuria. The Russians took nearly the entire manufacturing infrastructure of Manchuria back with them.

The Japanese government was incapable of reacting quickly. By early summer 1945, after the loss of the Marianas, the Japanese situation was clearly hopeless with the home islands within the range of the improved B-29s. The atomic bombs and the Soviet invasion might have been avoided, but Japan could not make timely decisions that would fundamentally change their conduct of the war.


The decision to drop the atomic bombs was made before Potsdam, with Truman concurring rather than leading. The theater commanders were then given full authority to select the timing and targets.

Hastings argues that the bombs saved lives, certainly compared to the loss of life that an invasion of the home islands would have entailed. Even if it had not been necessary to invade the home islands, the bombs hastened the very slow decision making of the Japanese. Because the Japanese had no effective air defenses many more lives would have been lost through firebombing cities and the total destruction of the Japanese transportation system.

Many key governmental and military officials committed seppuku (ritual suicide) after the surrender. Those who did not feared junior officers would assassinate them. Even after surrender, Japan still had millions of soldiers stationed in China and the remaining Pacific islands, many of whom did not want to surrender.

The topic is vast, but Hastings covers it thoroughly. This review short-changes some of the elements of the story (like details of the fighting for key islands and Japan’s futile efforts to enlist the aid of the Soviet Union to mediate with the Americans) in the interest of (relative) brevity. I highly recommend this book.

Published by Alfred A. Knopf, 2007

June 17, 1972 – Watergate Break In

On this day in history, a security guard discovered five men breaking into the offices of the Democratic National Committee inside the Watergate Building in Washington, D.C. The men were later found to be linked not only to the CIA but to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, or CREEP.

The Watergate Complex from the air

The Watergate Complex from the air

The scandal led to the discovery of multiple abuses of power by the administration of Richard Nixon, articles of impeachment, and the subsequent resignation of Nixon from the presidency on August 9, 1974. The scandal also resulted in the indictment of 69 people, with trials or pleas resulting in 25 being found guilty and incarcerated, many of whom were Nixon’s top administration officials.

The term Watergate has come to encompass an array of clandestine and often illegal activities undertaken by members of the Nixon administration, and the extension “gate” has come to be associated with scandal generally.

June 15, 1859 – Outbreak of The Pig War

On this day in history, the so-called “Pig War” broke out between the United States and the British Empire over a disputed boundary between Vancouver Island and the North American mainland.

According to the 1846 Treaty of Oregon, the border between the U.S. and Canada was supposed to run through “the middle of the channel” separating the U.S. mainland from Canada’s Vancouver Island. But the “channel” described in the treaty was actually two channels: the Haro Strait, nearest Vancouver Island, and the Rosario Strait, nearer the mainland. The San Juan Islands lay between, and both sides claimed the entire island group, and each established farms on them.


Lyman Cutlar, one of the American homesteaders, had a potato farm that the British claimed was inside their sheep pasture. On this day in history, Cutlar found a British pig eating tubers in his potato patch. It was not the first time this happened, and Cutlar had had enough, grabbing his rifle and killing the pig. Cutlar then offered the Irishman running the sheep ranch, Charles Griffin, $10 in compensation, but Griffin demanded $100. Tensions escalated.

British authorities threatened to arrest Cutlar and moreover forcibly remove all the American settlers from the islands. The Americans demanded military protection, which arrived in the form of about 60 United States infantrymen led by Captain George Pickett, who later gained fame as a Confederate General in the most famous battle of Gettysburg, “Pickett’s Charge” (during which no one could actually claim to have seen Pickett himself).

When American soldiers landed in the San Juan Islands, the Governor of Vancouver responded by sending gunships and Royal Marines. Captain Pickett then called for, and received, reinforcements along with cannon. The British bolstered their own forces with more ships and marines.

Capt. Pickett's first camp was located just west of the Hudson's Bay Company dock (left center).The above watercolor was done by a Royal Navy midshipman while standing on the deck of HMS Satellite. The date on the back of the painting reads July 27, 1859 -- the very day Pickett landed. Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Book and Manuscript Library

Capt. Pickett’s first camp was located just west of the Hudson’s Bay Company dock (left center).The above watercolor was done by a Royal Navy midshipman while standing on the deck of HMS Satellite. The date on the back of the painting reads July 27, 1859 — the very day Pickett landed.
Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Book and Manuscript Library

No shots were actually fired, however, while each side waited word from their governments. President James Buchanan, who had enough trouble trying to stave off a Civil War, sent a negotiator to the San Juans and soon most of the troops on both sides withdrawn. Thus the conflict ended with only one casualty: the pig.

From then on, the San Juans remained peaceful under joint military occupation until 1872, after an international arbitration committee, which met in Geneva for nearly a year, gave the territory to the Americans.

On November 25, 1872, the British withdrew their Royal Marines from the British Camp. The American troops were gone by July 1874.

Review of “Armageddon” by Max Hastings

Quick Summary:

The title Max Hastings chose for his history of the final year of World War II in Europe conveys something of the gripping drama he manages to create in this well-researched and fascinating work. In parallel to his later book Retribution about the last year of World War II against the Japanese, Armageddon focuses on the final year of World War II in Europe. His technique and style are very similar in both books. He begins each chapter with an overview of a topic (such as “the Bulge” or “Stalin’s Offensive” in Armageddon) and then supplements his summary with two categories of anecdotes: testimonies by relatively unknown “little people,” whose millions of stories compose the total history of the war, and analyses of the actions and judgments of the military and political leaders involved.


As The Washington Post pointed out in its review, “the months between September 1944 and May 1945 were among the cruelest and most destructive Europe had ever seen.” Hastings helps you get a sense of the horror of the battles, their brutality, the exhaustion of the soldiers, and the suffering of the citizenry. And all of it sounds fresh, even though you may have read these stories time and again (or watched them on the History Channel). The Washington Post review calls this book “magisterial” and it seems to be no exaggeration.

Detailed Review:

After the success of the Normandy Landing and subsequent breakout, it appeared in autumn of 1944 that the western Allies could roll into Germany with only slight opposition. That view proved to be woefully inaccurate for several reasons.

First, the allied generals had little competence in wars of rapid maneuver.

Second, allied soldiers were much more interested in surviving the war than their Nazi opponents, who man for man, proved to be much more competent soldiers. Hastings writes: “The defense of Germany against overwhelming odds reflected far more remarkable military skills than those displayed by the attackers, especially when all German operations had to be conducted under the dead hand of Hitler.”

Third, bickering among the allies exacerbated the problem, but the American General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s skill and tact overcame the biggest obstacles. The British General Bernard Montgomery comes across as very petty and egotistical, but fairly competent at a plodding strategy. Hastings says he “was a cleverer man and a far more professional soldier than [Eisenhower], but his crassness towards his peers was a fatal impediment to greatness.”

A fourth reason for the western allies’ tardiness was Hitler’s December offensive that produced the Battle of the Bulge, which came as a total surprise to the complacent allies.

Montgomery made a major strategic mistake in failing to secure the approaches to Antwerp, the largest port in Western Europe after it fell with little resistance. The port lies 50 or so miles from the sea on the River Scheldt. The Germans quickly occupied both banks of the river to prevent ships from reaching the port. It took several months of hard fighting to dislodge them from their positions, which they defended with substantial competence. The allies suffered from substantial supply shortages because the only ports available to them were the small channel ports in Normandy and Pas de Calais. Not until the approaches to Antwerp were secured in early 1945 could the allies bring to bear their enormous advantage in material and fire power.

General Montgomery

General Montgomery

The slowness of the western Allies’ progress caused great hardship among the conquered people of Nazi-occupied countries. The Dutch in particular had to suffer through their “Hongerwinter” at near starvation subsistence. Eisenhower persisted in a very cautious “wide front” approach, especially after the spectacular failure of Montgomery’s Market Garden attempt at rapid penetration of the German front. As German Field Marshal von Paulus, surveying the ruin of his country from a Soviet prison cell observed contemptuously, “If the British and Americans had not dilly-dallied so much, we could have got this whole thing over a great deal sooner.”

Hastings acknowledges the greater importance and weight of the war in the East conducted by the Soviets. He credits the Soviets with being much more competent that the western allies with maneuvering large armies, particularly in conducting encircling movements. He also emphasizes the extraordinary differences between the eastern and western “allies” in missions, behavior, discipline, suffering, willingness to accept casualties, and awareness to accomplish political as opposed to purely military goals.

Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union have we in the West had access to documentary evidence of the details of the horror of the war in the East. Hastings does not in any way exculpate the Germans, but he pulls no punches when describing the behavior of the Soviet army as it flooded into Eastern Europe and Germany. Moreover, he lays the blame for their barbaric behavior right at the top of the Soviet state.

The Soviets were particularly cruel to the Poles as well as the Germans. The Soviet army camped just outside of Warsaw and made no move to prevent the Germans from slaughtering the Polish resistance. They even refused to allow the western allies to land planes that dropped supplies to the Poles.

The Soviet army became an efficient fighting machine largely through instilling fear among its fighters. Political commissars were always just behind the front to shoot any soldiers who thought it might be safer in the rear. The Soviet front line troops feared their own officers more than the Germans. The NKVD recorded shooting 157,000 Soviet soldiers for desertion or cowardice in 1941-42 alone!

Josef Stalin, General Secretary of the Soviet Union

Josef Stalin, General Secretary of the Soviet Union

Amazingly, the Wehrmacht continued to fight effectively to the very end, even in the West, although many soldiers attempted to surrender to the British or Americans rather than to the Soviets. Hastings contrasts the Germans – who fought on bitterly even after the war clearly was lost, with the Japanese, who ultimately surrendered the home islands without firing a shot. Even in the last month of the war, the SS and the Hitler Jugend fought suicidally.

The fate of the German civilians can also be contrasted with that of the Japanese, who, once they surrendered, underwent a rather benign occupation. The Germans surrendered only after nearly all their cities had been reduced to rubble. Ironically, the first subchapter of the final chapter is entitled “Retribution,” the title of Hastings’ subsequent book about the final year of the war against Japan. Hastings details the plight of the Germans living in East Prussia near the end of the conflict. More than 2 million were “ethnically cleansed” from that area, and more than a million perished in their efforts to reach the West. The German civilians feared the Soviet army, with good reason. The Soviets systematically looted and raped wherever they went. The first Russians to enter Germany actually raped, then crucified on barn doors, the women of the first village they captured.

Hastings finds interesting, but does not criticize, Eisenhower’s decision not to race the Soviets to Berlin. The Yalta agreements had already ceded that part of Germany to the Soviets, who suffered more than 300,000 casualties in taking the German capital. The western allies had no stomach for losing that many men for purely political goals. The loss of many additional British and American lives would have accomplished nothing unless their governments were ready to repudiate their Yalta agreements so soon after making them and risk provoking a new war against the Soviets. Stalin, on the other hand, was willing to incur extraordinary losses to get what he wanted. He goaded two of his marshals, Zhukov and Konev, to vie for the honor of taking Berlin, even at the cost of many unnecessary lives. Hastings points out that for every British or American who was killed in the war, more than 30 Soviet citizens perished!

Hastings also details the plight of prisoners of both the Germans and the Soviets with many gruesome anecdotes. Less than 10% of the Germans taken prisoner at Stalingrad ever returned home. Perhaps the saddest of all fates befell Soviet soldiers captured by the Germans: those “lucky” enough to survive the war were often shot by the NKVD or sentenced to 25 years in the Gulag for “collaborating,” i.e., not fighting to their death.

The western allies were hardly blameless, conducting a strategic bombing offensive designed to destroy whole cities and being guilty in several incidents of killing of prisoners. Nevertheless, their record of atrocities pales in comparison with either the Nazis or the Soviets.

This review does not do justice to Hastings’ book because, in the interest of (relative) brevity, I cannot cite or effectively summarize its many personal anecdotes that add color, depth, and credibility to his narrative. This is a very good book; in fact, Norman Davies, in No Simple Victory, cites it as one of the best books on the war.

Published by Alfred A. Knopf, 2004

June 9, 1842 – Henry Clay on “The Forces of Ignorance”

On this day in history, Henry Clay, in a speech delivered in Lexington, Kentucky, was looking back over his political career, and in particular, his fateful decision to accept the position of Secretary of State under President John Quincy Adams. Followers of Andrew Jackson called this evidence of a corrupt political bargain that ensured the election of Quincy Adams over Andrew Jackson. And Jackson and his friends never once let the issue die throughout Clay’s career.

Henry Clay represented Kentucky in the United States Senate several times throughout his public service career: from 1806 to 1807, 1810 to 1811, 1831 to 1842, and 1849 until his death in 1852. credit: United States Senate Historical Office

Henry Clay represented Kentucky in the United States Senate several times throughout his public service career: from 1806 to 1807, 1810 to 1811, 1831 to 1842, and 1849 until his death in 1852.
credit: United States Senate Historical Office

Clay acknowledged in this speech that he should not have taken Adam’s offer, because he did sense it might have negative repercussions. But he expressed “astonishment at the indefatigability with which the calumny was propagated, and the zealous partisan use to which it was applied, not only without evidence, but in the face of a full and complete refutation.” He went on to decry his own “under-rating of the power of detraction and the force of ignorance.”

That force was powerful indeed, and pretty much put an end to Clay’s ambitions to serve as president. Andrew Jackson, on the other hand, who was laughably more dishonorable than Clay, yet outraged at any hint of his own shortcomings, went on to become the seventh president of the United States, and to serve a much longer tenure as the fact of the twenty dollar bill.

Book Review of “Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower’s Campaign for Peace” by Alex Von Tunzelmann


A number of crises since 1945 have propelled the world to the brink of another global war, which is why it is so critical for a powerful nation like the United States to be led by someone of sound judgment and temperament.  One of those pivotal moments occurred on October 29, 1956, when Great Britain, France, and Israel all invaded Egypt in a concerted effort to reclaim the Suez Canal.  Simultaneously, the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, both complicating the developing crisis and deflecting international attention.  Alex Von Tunzelman’s Blood and Sand is a gripping retelling of those events, which took place during the closing days of an American presidential election.

Smoke rises from oil tanks beside the Suez Canal hit during the initial Anglo-French assault on Port Said, November 5, 1956.

Smoke rises from oil tanks beside the Suez Canal hit during the initial Anglo-French assault on Port Said, November 5, 1956.

Gamal Abdel Nasser had become the president of Egypt after deposing the pro-British leadership in 1952.  He compounded the offense in Western eyes by nationalizing the British- and French-controlled Suez Canal in July of 1956 in retaliation for the failure of Britain or the United States to finance his pet project, the Aswan Dam.

At the time, Britain was the largest single shareholder in the Suez Canal Company, one of Britain’s last remaining colonial possessions.  Some 1.5 million barrels of oil a day went through the canal, of which 1.2 million were destined for Western Europe.  According to the author, the British Treasury estimated the value of its assets in the Canal Zone to be 500 million pounds.  But even aside from the profits, Britain needed the oil.  In addition, though not measurable in dollars or barrels, Britain did not want to lose “its divinely and racially ordained place at the top of the world.”


When Nassar nationalized the Suez Canal Company, all of that was threatened.  British Prime Minister Anthony Eden treated the nationalization as a direct affront to British prestige and became so incensed that (according to Von Tunzelmann ) he ordered Nasser’s assassination.

But, as the BBC History Magazine reported:

“. . . for as much as the operation [seizing the canal from Egypt] was a success in military terms, it was a disaster politically. World opinion roundly condemned the three nations for their aggression and lack of respect for Egyptian sovereignty. Fury and outrage erupted across the Islamic world at Britain’s perceived neo-colonial behaviour.  . . . “

The United States was also opposed to the violation of Egyptian sovereignty.  Both Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, were somewhat incapacitated with health issues.  They were, however, able to exert not only moral and financial suasion, but also the threat of potential military force against the British, French, and Israelis.  When Eisenhower was warned by politicos that checking the Israeli advance might cost him New York’s electoral college votes in the coming election, Eisenhower said he would rather be right than president.  

British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden (left), and President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles in 1956, (right).

British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden (left), and President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles in 1956, (right).

To make matters infinitely more complicated, as Von Tunzelmann reported, “…the high point of the Suez crisis – From October 22 to November 6, 1956 – would coincide precisely with the biggest rebellion yet against Soviet power, which took place in Hungary from October 23 to November 4.”  The people of Hungary spontaneously revolted against the incompetent rule of their government, which was pretty much a puppet of the Soviet Union.  At first, the Russians tried to placate the Hungarians by installing a new set of puppets, but when that failed to quell the unrest, Khrushchev ordered a full scale invasion.  The Hungarian rebels fought bravely, but they had only small arms against tanks.

Russian tanks enter Budapest

Russian tanks enter Budapest

The author cogently summarizes the broader meaning of the crisis for the various players:

“The crisis would be intensely emotional for the nations involved.  For Hungary and Egypt, it would be about freedom.  For Israel it would be about survival.  For France, it would be about saving territory it considered integral to the republic.  For the Soviet Union, it would be about resistance to Western colonialism as well as reasserting and extending its own influence.  For the United States, it would be about decency and the trustworthiness of its allies.  And for Britain, as the then leader of the House of Commons Rab Butler admitted in his memoirs, it would be about the ‘illiberal resentment at the loss of Empire, the rise of coloured nationalism the transfer of world leadership to the United States.’”


All of these developments ratcheted up tensions among the major Cold War players, a dangerous situation given that the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Britain all held nuclear weapons.  The Americans felt powerless to aid the Hungarians militarily without starting a nuclear war.

Von Tunzelmann’s book gives a nearly hour by hour account of the actions at the highest levels of the Soviet, American, British, French, and Egyptian governments.  In the author’s account, Anthony Eden appears nearly unhinged and exceedingly unwise; Khrushchev is volatile; the Israelis are aggressive and unscrupulous; and Nasser is simply over his head.  Eisenhower is something of a hero in this tale:  his prudence and calm manage to avoid a worldwide catastrophe even though he was unable to help the Hungarians other than by leading the condemnation of the Soviets in the United Nations.

Positive Outcome:  Presidents Eisenhower and Nasser meeting in New York, 1960

Positive Outcome: Presidents Eisenhower and Nasser meeting in New York, 1960

Von Tunzelmann points out that the Cold War put the United States in an awkward position in seeking influence in the third world against the Communist powers.  Prior to the Suez Crisis, the United States had struggled to maintain a balance in world affairs in remaining allied to the French and British colonial powers while preaching liberal democracy and anti-colonialism to the rest of the world.  When push came to shove, Eisenhower upheld American ideals even though he had to chastise his closest allies and risk the wrath of Israeli’s supporters in the American electorate.  

Evaluation:  This is an even-handed, well-written account of a perilous time.  Perhaps the best lesson to come out of this history is how fortunate the world was to have an American leader who was experienced in battle, adept politically, and calm under pressure.

Rating:  4/5

Published by Harper, an imprint of HarperCollins, 2016