Even before World War II ended, American strategists had concerns about potential Soviet incursions into other countries. In particular, the State Department thought it critical to keep the Soviets out of Korea – because not only would Korea provide ice-free ports to the USSR, but it would allow them a strategic advantage in relation both to China and Japan.
As Max Hastings reported in his book, The Korean War, less than twenty-four hours after the atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, the U.S. military was planning to occupy Korea. The Russians of course objected and the U.N. got involved, dividing the country along the 38th Parallel.
North of the line, the Soviets installed the ruthless dictator Kim Il Sung, and south of the line the Americans sponsored its own ruthless dictator, Syngman Rhee. Relations were not good between the two parts of Korea, and by 1949 border skirmishes were frequent. The defeat of the American-sponsored Nationalist army of Chiang Kai Shek by the Communist army of Mao Tse Tung in China hardened American attitudes and exacerbated fears about the Communists. Thus when Kim Il Sung decided (with Stalin’s express permission) to invade South Korea in 1950, it was only a matter of time before the U.S. went to war.
On June 24, 1950, the communist North Korean army swept into South Korea and within days captured the capital, Seoul.
South Korea and NATO were caught completely off guard. For several weeks, it looked as if the North Koreans would swiftly conquer the entire peninsula. However, by a stroke of luck, the Soviet Union was boycotting the United Nations Security Council, and their absence allowed the United States to lead the passage of a resolution that authorized the use of force by the UN to oust the North Koreans. American General Douglas MacArthur was put in charge of the UN forces. He quickly assembled a somewhat ragtag army consisting primarily of American troops based in Japan and moved to the southeast corner of Korea. There they established a defensive perimeter around the port of Pusan and arrested the impetus of the invasion.
MacArthur observes the naval shelling of Inchon from USS Mount McKinley, 15 September 1950
The United States was reluctant to send a large force to defend Korea because it believed many more troops were needed in Europe to deter a Soviet invasion there. In addition, Truman did not want to risk a more general conflict, and never sought a formal declaration of war. Thus, what was to evolve into a four-year, intense armed conflict became labeled legally as a “police action.”
MacArthur had a reputation as a capable (some said brilliant) military strategist. He formulated a plan for a counter-offensive that involved landing a large force at Inchon, well behind enemy lines. The Inchon landing allowed UN forces to cut the supply lines of the North Koreans, who were soon driven into a wild retreat. By October, the North Korean army had been driven from the South and was fleeing north of the 38th parallel (the border between North and South Korea).
MacArthur wanted to destroy the North Korean army even if it required chasing them all the way to the border of China. Truman feared that chasing them too close to the Chinese border might provoke the Chinese into greatly expanding the scope of the conflict. But the Chinese did opt to intervene in any event and nearly destroyed the American Eighth Army.
What to do next became the subject of a vitriolic debate within and between various factions of the American civilian and military establishments, and the subject of dozens if not hundreds of history books.
MacArthur wanted to hit the Chinese with every available weapon, even atomic bombs. At the very least, he wanted to bomb supply bases in Chinese territory. In addition, he wanted to “unleash Chiang,” that is, use the Nationalist Chinese army on Formosa either to invade China proper or reinforce UN troops in Korea. In his view, he was being forced by Washington to fight a “limited war” with one hand tied behind his back.
Truman wanted to limit the conflict as much as possible. MacArthur attempted to take his case directly to the American people. He circumvented civilian authority by publishing a letter to the American Legion outlining his position. Truman fired him for his insubordination, even though MacArthur did not directly disobey a presidential order.
President Truman signing a proclamation declaring a national emergency that initiated U.S. involvement in the Korean War
Eventually the war bogged down and peace talks began in July 1951. After three years of fighting – and no conclusive winner – an armistice ended the war on this date in history, July 27, 1953. The prisoners of war in each of the Koreas were allowed to choose which side they wanted to live on and a new border was drawn between South and North Korea with a demilitarized zone in between.
Because the war ended with an armistice rather than a formal peace treaty, the countries remained technically at war. Article IV of the Armistice recommended that “the governments concerned on both sides” convene a conference within three months of signing to organize the withdrawal of foreign forces from the peninsula and settle the “Korea question”—i.e., who would rule over a reunited Korea. Talks began in Geneva in 1954, but quickly broke down and were not resumed.
The Korean War remains unpopular and controversial.
Historian Max Hastings contends that, “above all, perhaps, Korea merits close consideration as a military rehearsal for the subsequent disaster in Vietnam.” Indeed, in his detailed history of the conflict, he draws many parallels to the ill-fated war in Indochina.
As Joshua Keating agreed in his article for Slate Magazine:
More than anything else, Korea was an introduction to the sort of wars America would fight going forward—wars in which the U.S. has had overwhelming superiority in technology and firepower but has been hampered by a lack of on-the-ground understanding, unclear aims, and the stark fact that the locals are often more willing to fight and die for what they want for their own country than we are for what we want for someone else’s.”
Meanwhile, efforts to “end” the war continue. The Singapore Times reported on July 23, 2018:
North Korea’s media intensified its demands . . . for South Korea to implement its summit agreement to work towards declaring an end to the Korean War, calling it a ‘historic task’ that cannot be delayed anymore . . .
South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un agreed in their April 27 summit to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War this year, replacing the armistice that halted the hostilities with a peace treaty for permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.”
South Korean President Moon Jae-in (left) and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un have agreed to formally end the Korean War this year with a peace treaty. PHOTO: AFP
Unfortunately, hostilities have resumed, which some attribute to the ascendancy of Kim Jong Un’s sister in the North Korean government. According to Jung Pak, a senior fellow at Brookings Institution, “North Korea wants to punish South Korea for it siding with the U.S. on sanctions and for its inability to deliver on a more pliant President Trump when it comes to (the) lifting of sanctions.”
In 2021, the New York Times reported that one-upmanship between the two countries is intensifying in the dangerous form of an arms race:
‘As both sides act and react through arms buildups in the name of national defense, it will create a vicious cycle that will eventually undermine their defense and deepen their security dilemma,’ said Jang Cheol-wun, an analyst at the Korea Institute for National Unification, a government-funded research group.”
You can read more about the current situation in a continually updated BBC site here.
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