Harvard Law professor Noah Feldman has given us a thoroughly researched, well written, solid analysis of the inner workings of the U.S. Supreme Court during the time it was dominated by four appointees of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The appointees, the Scorpions of the title, all began as supporters of FDR’s New Deal, and thus putative “liberals.” However, over two decades on the Court their perspectives matured and diverged, and they became rivals for intellectual leadership in constitutional scholarship. Their rivalry in some case even became personal detestation.
Feldman’s account includes short, revealing mini-biographies of each subject jurist. Felix Frankfurter was an ebullient Jew [“an interesting little man but very jew” in the exact words of Eleanor Roosevelt] who began as America’s leading liberal intellectual, but evolved into its most famous judicial conservative. Hugo Black was a former Ku Klux Klansman who became a vigorous advocate of free speech and civil rights. Robert Jackson was a backcountry lawyer in Upstate New York who later became chief prosecutor in the Nuremberg trials. William O. Douglas at first sought to use his appointment to the Court as a stepping stone to the presidency, but stymied in that pursuit, expanded individual freedom “beyond what anyone before had dreamed.”
The most pressing legal issue in FDR’s presidency was the constitutionality of various New Deal programs. Many of those programs infringed on the “liberty of contract” [such as the “liberty” to go to work at age 12 or work more than 60 hours per week in menial jobs] enunciated in the 1905 decision, Lochner v. New York. Although each individual’s “liberty” is expressly protected by the 14th Amendment, nowhere in the Constitution does the term “liberty of contract” appear. The first eight cases on the constitutionality of New Deal legislation to reach the Court resulted in 5-4 decisions against the statutes. Feldman reprises the oft-told tale of FDR’s court packing scheme; how testimony by Jackson (then Solicitor General) before Congress supported the plan; how Frankfurter opposed it; and how a change in opinion by Justice Owen Roberts obviated the scheme by providing the Court with a 5-4 majority to overrule Lochner. Ultimately, it was Frankfurter’s doctrine of “judicial restraint,” giving substantial credence to the acts of the legislature, which carried the day.
Feldman deftly traces the evolution of various legal doctrines through seminal decisions rendered by the Court from the late 1930’s through the mid 1950’s. We watch a Court willing to allow the internment of Japanese citizens during World War II evolve into the champion of civil rights that outlawed racial segregation in schools in Brown v. Board of Education. Feldman’s analysis is worthy of a law review article, yet his style and diction make the material accessible to the lay man.
Non-lawyers who may not enjoy legal analysis will still be interested in Feldman’s description of the clash of personalities that produced the epic decisions:
“Frustration bred contempt. From allies sipping champagne to celebrate one another’s joining the Court, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson had formed camps and become bitter enemies. Frankfurter despised Douglas, whom he called one of the ‘two completely evil men I have ever met….’ Frankfurter called Douglas, Black, and Murphy [another justice] ‘the Axis.’ One-upping Frankfurter, Douglas called him ‘Der Fuehrer.’ The hatred between Black and Jackson ran so deep that it threatened to ruin the reputations of both men. The friendship between Frankfurter and Jackson seemed to depend more on disdain for Douglas and Black than any closer connection. Douglas and Black voted together but were not intimate friends. For them, common ground meant revulsion for Frankfurter and Jackson.
Feldman’s account of the machinations behind making the Brown opinion unanimous is particularly compelling. When the case first came before the Court, three justices (all southerners), including Chief Justice Fred Vinson, believed that the old “separate but equal” doctrine enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson was the correct interpretation of the Constitution. Frankfurter knew that to rule segregated public facilities were unconstitutional would effect a social revolution, and so it required as strong and forceful opinion by the Court as possible. A 6-3 decision would not project the gravitas necessary to produce willing compliance, particularly in the South. After the oral argument, he persuaded a majority of the Court to defer decision and to require a re-argument the following year. This ploy gave him time to try to convert the other justices to his views.
Remarkably, before the second oral argument, Vinson died of a heart attack. Frankfurter never liked Vinson, and told a former law clerk, “[T]his is the first solid piece of evidence I’ve ever had that there really is a God.” President Eisenhower then appointed Earl Warren, a consummate politician and a strong supporter of civil rights, as Chief Justice.
Even with Warren in the camp to overturn Plessy, the battle for a unanimous opinion was far from over. Frankfurter himself had to overcome his own judicial philosophy of judicial restraint. Jackson saw nothing in the constitutional text or precedent history to make segregation unconstitutional. Accordingly, he favored frank recognition that the court was making new law despite history and precedent, a position with which none of his colleagues would agree. He, however, fell ill and finally was browbeaten by Warren to join the unanimous opinion. A combination of Frankfurter’s cogent arguments and Warren’s cajoling induced the two remaining southern judges to join the rest of the court to make the opinion unanimous. The resulting opinion, although unanimous, is something of a hodge-podge of rationales. Nevertheless, it is usually considered the most important Supreme Court case of the 20th Century.
Evaluation: There is much more to this splendid book than my review can cover in a reasonably short space. I recommend it strongly for lawyer and layman alike.